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Biotechnology Regulation Under the
Toxic Substances Control Act
I. Introduction
Biotechnology may generally be defined as the use of liv-
ing organisms, or substances produced or derived from such
organisms, to make or modify a product.' This definition is
very broad, and encompasses both traditional industrial uses
of biological processes2 as well as currently developing ad-
vanced biotechnological techniques such as recombinant DNA
technology (commonly referred to as genetic engineering).3
Biotechnology is rapidly evolving from laboratory scale
research and development toward large scale industrial com-
mercialization.4 The potential areas for industrial application
of biotechnology are extremely diverse. Although biotechnol-
ogy is expected to have its most immediate impact in the
1. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Commercial Biotechnol-
ogy: An International Analysis 3, 503 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 OTA Report];
Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Impacts of Applied Genetics: Micro-
Organisms, Plants and Animals 4, 49 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 OTA Report].
2. Traditional industrial uses of biological processes include processes such as
beer brewing, winemaking, and cheesemaking. See 1981 OTA Report, supra note 1, at
49. Classical plant breeding techniques also fall within the broad definition of bio-
technology. See id. at 137-40.
3. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the genetic material found in all living organ-
isms, and contains the genetic code responsible for all inherited characteristics of
such organisms. Recombinant DNA technology is used to produce hybrid DNA mole-
cules composed of DNA from different sources. These hybrid or recombinant DNA
molecules may be used for purely scientific purposes such as genetic research, or for
commercial purposes such as the production of a specific product. See generally 1984
OTA Report, supra note 1, at 33-43.
4. See id. at 65-113. Although biotechnology commercialization was initiated by
small entrepreneurial firms organized to apply advanced biotechnological techniques
for specific product development, many industrial giants are now heavily involved in
biotechnology research and development. Note also that despite the greater amount
of attention that has been paid to the smaller biotechnology-based firms, "most of the
patents in the field assigned to date are owned by large corporations." Webber, Bio-
technology Firms Gird For Clash over Patent Claims, Chem. & Eng. News, Dec. 10,
1984, at 18, 19.
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pharmaceutical industry, 5 many other areas of potential appli-
cation also exist. These include plant and animal agriculture,
specialty and commodity chemicals, food processing and addi-
tives, pesticides, pollution control, toxic waste treatment, met-
als extraction, and enhanced oil recovery.' Some of these ap-
plications seek to avoid contact between the microorganisms
employed and the outside environment;' however, other appli-
cations will involve the deliberate release of naturally occur-
ring or genetically engineered microorganisms into the
environment.8
Although the potential benefits of commercial biotechnol-
ogy applications are great, there are also legitimate concerns
being raised regarding the potential adverse environmental
and health effects which may arise with biotechnology com-
mercialization. These concerns have been particularly directed
at technologies which are likely to release deliberately either
naturally occurring or genetically engineered microorganisms
into the environment.'
5. See 1984 OTA Report, supra note 1, at 119-57; 1981 OTA Report, supra note
1, at 59-82.
6. See generally 1984 OTA Report, supra note 1, at 159-250; 1981 OTA Report,
supra note 1, at 85-192.
7. The food processing, chemical, and pharmaceutical industries are likely to use
fermentation technology in conjunction with naturally occurring or genetically engi-
neered microorganisms to produce specific chemical products. Fermentation technol-
ogy employs microorganisms as microbial chemical reactors which convert raw mater-
ials into end products via biochemical reactions. The microorganisms, raw materials,
and end products are all initially contained within a controlled reaction vessel known
as a fermenter. Contact between the microorganisms contained within the fermenter
and the outside environment is sought to be avoided because contamination can in-
terfere with or destroy the productive microorganism or the desired end product. See
1981 OTA Report, supra note 1, at 49-56; see also McGarity & Bayer, Federal Regu-
lation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 461, 467-73 (1983). How-
ever, negligent operation of the fermenter or accident can bring about contact he-
tween the microorganism contained within the fermenter and the environment. See
McGarity & Bayer, supra, at 468-70.
8. The use of naturally occurring or genetically engineered microorganisms as
microbial pesticides, for pollution control or toxic waste treatment, for in situ metal
extraction from mining ore, or for enhanced oil recovery will require the deliberate
release of such microorganisms into the environment. See 1984 OTA Report, supra
note 1, at 217-30; McGarity & Bayer, supra note 7, at 471-73.
9. A congressional report based on 1983 joint House Subcommittee hearings con-
cerning the environmental implications of genetic engineering concluded:
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/3
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The concomitant issue of the adequacy of the existing
federal regulatory framework to prevent any adverse health or
environmental effects associated with the commercial use of
biotechnology has also been raised.10 Many federal regulatory
statutes have been generally identified as applicable to some
aspect of commercial biotechnology. More specifically, the
federal government's Office of Science and Technology Policy
has issued for public comment a document which identifies
various federal statutes which will play a key role in biotech-
nology regulation,' as well as policy statements by the various
federal agencies which will be involved in such regulation.12 A
partial list of the more prominent federal statutes already
The potential environmental risks associated with the deliberate release of
genetically engineered organisms or the translocation of any new organism
into an ecosystem are best described as "low probability, high consequence
risks;" that is, while there is only a small possibility that damage could occur,
the damage that could occur is great.
Staff of House Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of House Comm. on Sci-
ence and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on the Environmental Implica-
tions of Genetic Engineering 9 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter cited as House Sub-
comm. Report]. The report also noted that "predicting the specific type, magnitude,
or probability of environmental effects associated with the deliberate release of genet-
ically engineered organisms will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, at the pre-
sent time." Id. at 10.
10. See generally id.; see also Goroski, Regulation of Designer Genes, N.Y. St.
B.A. Envtl. L. Sec. J., Dec. 1984, at 1-4; Karny, Regulation of Genetic Engineering:
Less Concern About Frankensteins But Time For Action On Commercial Produc-
tion, 12 U. Tol. L. Rev. 815 (1981); McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology Released
From the Lab: The Environmental Regulatory Framework, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L. Inst.) 10366 (1983); McGarity & Bayer, supra note 7. Note that in one study pre-
pared for the federal government concerning current and future federal biotechnology
policy issues, many study participants voiced concern over the federal government's
"ill-defined regulatory role" in biotechnological research, development, and commer-
cialization. See Arthur D. Little, Inc., Study of Federal Biotechnology Policy Issues at
1-14 (1984) (prepared for Div. of Policy Research and Analysis, National Science
Foundation). The study identified the areas of biotechnology legislation and regula-
tion as a high priority item. Id.
11. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,
49 Fed. Reg. 50,856 (Dec. 31, 1984). Note that some state statutory authority for
biotechnology regulation also exists. For example, New York law provides for state
regulation of "recombinant DNA activity." See N.Y. Public Health Law §§ 3220-3223
(McKinney 1985); see also Goroski, supra note 10, at 4.
12. These agencies include the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the United States Dep't of Agriculture
(USDA). See 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,858.
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identified includes:
(1) the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA);13
(2) the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
(FFDCA); 14
(3) the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA); 15
(4) the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA);1e
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. 11983). See also McChesney & Adler,
supra note 10, at 10,371-73. Note that NEPA has been the subject of biotechnology-
related litigation, see Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753
(D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (preliminary injunction warranted
to prevent deliberate release of genetically altered bacteria into environment in field
test sponsored by National Institute of Health (NIH) because NIH, which had ap-
proval power over release, failed to compile environmental impact statement required
by NEPA); see also Comment, Regulating the Environmental Release of Genetically
Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 891 (1985); Note, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler: Genetic Engi-
neering and NEPA's EIS Requirement, 2 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 138 (1984).
14. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). FDA has promulgated its pro-
posed biotechnology regulatory policy pursuant to FFDCA. See 49 Fed. Reg. at
50,878-80; see also Clausi, Interfaces of the Food Industry with Biotechnology, 40
Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 259 (1985); Korwek, FDA Regulation of Biotechnology as a
New Method of Manufacture, 37 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 289 (1982); Korwek &
Trinker, Perspectives on the FDA Status of Drug Products Manufactured by the
Recombinant DNA Technique, 36 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 517 (1981); McGarity &
Bayer, supra note 7, at 503-05; Comment, Regulation of Genetically Engineered
Foods Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 33 Am. U. L. Rev. 899
(1984).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982). OSHA has announced its own guidelines per-
taining to occupational safety and health as related to biotechnology. See 50 Fed.
Reg. 14468 (April 12, 1985); see also Korwek, OSHA Regulation of Industrial Appli-
cations of Recombinant DNA Technology, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 284 (1981); McGarity &
Bayer, supra note 7, at 503.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982 & Supp. I 1983). RCRA has been identified by
EPA as a potential source of authority for federal biotechnology regulation. See 49
Fed. Reg. at 50,867-68. RCRA is designed to regulate the generation, transport, treat-
ment and disposal of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. at § 6902(4). A RCRA hazardous
waste must be a solid waste, see id. at § 6903(5), although RCRA defines solid waste
very broadly. See id. at § 6903(27). Thus "[tihe solid wastes that genetic technology
firms and laboratories generate, store, transport, treat, and dispose of could face
stringent EPA regulation under . . . RCRA if the agency were to label them hazard-
ous." McGarity & Bayer, supra note 7, at 535 (footnote omitted). No biotechnology
wastes or living organisms are currently listed as RCRA hazardous wastes. Cf. 49 Fed.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/3
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(5) the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
cide Act (FIFRA); 17 and
(6) the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).15
Reg. at 50,866. Nevertheless, it has been advocated that RCRA should be "considered
by the food processing industry and the pharmaceutical industry that may produce
living waste from the large scale containment methods." McChesney & Adler, supra
note 10, at 10,369 n.37.
17. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. II 1984). FIFRA regulates pesticides by
requiring pesticide manufacturers to register pesticides with EPA prior to sale or dis-
tribution. See id. at § 136a. Pesticides are defined by FIFRA as "any substance or
mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating
any pest, and . . . any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant
regulator, defoliant, or dessicant." Id. at § 136u. EPA's position is that this statutory
language is sufficiently broad on its face to include both naturally occurring and ge-
netically engineered microorganisms which are employed as microbial pesticides. See
49 Fed. Reg. at 50,880-86.
EPA has already asserted its FIFRA jurisdiction over microorganisms used as
microbial pesticides. Special data requirements necessary for pesticide registration of
biochemical and microbial pesticides have been promulgated by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. §
158.65 (1985). The data requirements for microbial pesticides apply to both naturally
occurring and genetically modified microorganisms. Id. at § 158.65(b)(1). EPA has
also explicitly stated that "[niovel microbial pesticides (i.e., genetically modified or
non-indigenous microbial pesticides) will be subject to additional data or information
requirements on a case-by-case basis .... " Id. at § 158.165(b)(2).
Another example of EPA's assertion of FIFRA jurisdiction over potentially com-
mercial biotechnology is in the area of field testing of pesticides. Pursuant to section
5 of FIFRA, a pesticide manufacturer may acquire an experimental use permit (EUP)
to test the effectiveness of a pesticide prior to seeking final registration. See 7 U.S.C.
at § 136c. EPA has not normally required an EUP for a small scale field test of a
pesticide conducted prior to final registration. See 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1985). However,
EPA has promulgated an interim policy statement singling out microbial pesticides
"which contain naturally occurring microorganisms for use in environments where
they are not native (nonindigenous or exotic) or microorganisms which have been
genetically altered or manipulated by humans." Interim Policy Statement on Small
Scale Field Tests for Microbial Pesticides, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,659, 40,660 (Oct. 17, 1984).
EPA now requires notification prior to all small scale field tests involving such micro-
bial pesticides to determine whether ark EUP is required. See id.; see also 49 Fed.
Reg. at 50885-86. Note that EPA has already granted two EUP's for small-scale field
testing of two genetically engineered microbial pesticides. See Notice of Issuance of
Experimental Use Permits, 50 Fed. Reg. 49,760-62 (Dec. 4, 1985). It thus seems clear
that EPA intends to exercise its full FIFRA regulatory powers in the regulation of
both naturally occurring and genetically engineered microorganisms used as microbial
pesticides. This will have a significant impact on the manufacturers of such pesti-
cides, as FIFRA "clearly provides a comprehensive scheme" for pesticide regulation.
Karny, supra note 10, at 850.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). EPA has promulgated its
proposed TSCA biotechnology regulatory policy. See 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,886-95.
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All of the above statutes raise interesting issues concern-
ing their applicability and suitability for biotechnology regula-
tion. However, this comment is limited in scope to a discus-
sion of TSCA as statutory authority for the federal regulation
of biotechnology. It primarily explores the legal issues and ar-
guments likely to be addressed if litigation is brought chal-
lenging TSCA regulation of biotechnology, and also briefly
discusses the particular TSCA provisions which EPA has
highlighted as being particularly applicable to biotechnology
regulation.
II. Statutory Authority For TSCA Biotechnology
Regulation
A. Background
TSCA was enacted by Congress in 1976 in response to a
perceived need for comprehensive, federally imposed regula-
tion of toxic chemicals.19 TSCA empowers EPA to:
(1) Acquire data regarding the effects of chemical
substances and mixtures on health and the
environment. 20
(2) Regulate chemical substances and mixtures
which present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or
the environment.21
(3) Take action with respect to chemical substances
and mixtures which EPA finds to be imminent hazards.22
Only TSCA-defined chemical substances and mixtures
are subject to TSCA regulation. A TSCA chemical substance
is "any organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecu-
19. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982 &
Supp. I1 1984)). Six years of legislative activity preceded TSCA's enactment. See gen-
erally R. Druley & G. Ordway, The Toxic Substances Control Act 10-27 (1977); see
also Gaynor, The Toxic Substances Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 Vand. L.
Rev. 1149, 1149-51 (1977).
20. See 15 U.S.C. at § 2601(b)(1).
21. See id. at § 2601(b)(2).
22. See id.
[Vol. 3
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lar identity, including-(i) any combination of such sub-
stances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical
reaction or occurring in nature; and (ii) any element or un-
combined radical. 23
Specifically excluded from the definition of chemical sub-
stances are pesticides, tobacco, tobacco products, firearms,
source materials, special nuclear materials, byproduct materi-
als, foods, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, or devices.2 4 Mix-
tures are also excluded from the statutory definition of chemi-
cal substances,2 5  and are separately defined as "any
combination of two or more chemical substances if the combi-
nation does not occur in nature and is not, in whole or in part,
the result of a chemical reaction. '2' However, a combination
of chemical substances occurring, in whole or in part, as a re-
sult of a chemical reaction is a mixture if:
(1) none of the chemical substances comprising the
combination is a new chemical substance;27 and
(2) the combination could have been manufactured
for commercial purposes without a chemical reaction at
the time of the combination of the chemical substances.
2
B. Living Microorganisms as TSCA Chemical Substances
As a threshold matter, EPA's authority to regulate either
23. Id. at § 2602(2)(A). EPA has identically defined chemical substances in its
chemical inventory reporting regulations, see Inventory Reporting Regulations, 40
C.F.R. § 710.2(h) (1985).
24. See 15 U.S.C. at § 2602(2)(B)(ii)-(vi). Pesticides are regulated by EPA pursu-
ant to FIFRA. Tobacco, tobacco products, and firearms are regulated by the Dep't of
Commerce's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. Source materials, special nu-
clear materials, and byproduct materials are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). Foods, food additives, drugs, cosmetics, and devices are regu-
lated by FDA pursuant to FFDCA.
25. 15 U.S.C. at § 2602(2)(B)(i).
26. Id. at § 2602(8) (emphasis added).
27. TSCA section 8(b) required EPA to compile and publish an inventory list of
all chemical substances manufactured or processed in the United States within 315
days of TSCA's enactment. See id. at § 2607(b). Any chemical substance not on the
inventory list is deemed to be a new chemical substance. Id. at § 2602(9).
28. Id. at § 2602(8).
19851
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naturally occurring or genetically engineered microorganisms
pursuant to TSCA depends upon whether such microorgan-
isms fall within the TSCA definitions of mixtures or chemical
substances. Because EPA's current position is that micro-
organisms and other life forms are not TSCA mixtures, 9
EPA's regulatory authority hinges entirely upon the position
that products of commercial biotechnology, including both
naturally occurring and genetically engineered living microor-
ganisms, fall within the TSCA definition of chemical
substances.
Although EPA at one time took the position that geneti-
cally engineered microorganisms were not within the ambit of
TSCA's statutory definition of chemical substances,"° EPA's
29. EPA employs two arguments to support this position. First, by definition, no
naturally occurring life form can be a TSCA mixture. See id. at § 2602(8). Second,
although a combination of chemical substances occurring as a result of a chemical
reaction may be classified as a mixture if all the chemical substances involved appear
on the TSCA section 8(b) chemical inventory list and the combination could have
been manufactured for commercial purposes without a chemical reaction, EPA does
not believe that life forms fit within this aspect of the TSCA mixture definition
because:
[AIll the chemical substances in any life form are not likely to be on the
[section 8(b)] [i]nventory, and it certainly is very unlikely that one could pro-
duce a life form by combining the component chemical substances without
using chemical reactions. Thus even an artificially produced life form cannot
be a mixture.
House Subcomm. Report app. C, supra note 9, at 144 n.2 (emphasis in original); cf.
49 Fed. Reg. at 50886-96 (EPA makes no mention of regulation of biotechnology
products as TSCA mixtures).
30. In December of 1977, then EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle responded
to a Senate inquiry concerning TSCA regulation of genetically engineered
microorganisms by stating:
[Allthough there is a general consensus that recombinant DNA molecules are
"chemical substances" within the meaning of section 3 of TSCA, it is not at
all clear whether a host organism containing recombined DNA molecules fits-
or was intended to fit that definition . . . . If such organisms are subject to
TSCA on the grounds that they are a "combination of... substances occur-
ring in whole or in part as a result of chemical reaction," the [algency might
logically have to include all living things in the definition of "chemical sub-
stance" an interpretation which ... Congress neither contemplated nor
intended.
Letter from Douglas M. Costle, EPA Administrator to Adlai E. Stevenson, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation (Dec. 9, 1977), reprinted in House Subcomm. on Sci-
ence, Technology, and Space, Oversight Report: Recombinant DNA Research and its
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/3
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current position is that TSCA's definition of chemical sub-
stances encompasses both naturally occurring and genetically
engineered living microorganisms, as well as the chemical
products produced by such organisms. 1 However, the legal
validity of this position is uncertain, and "it is not unlikely
that EPA's authority may be challenged in court. '3 2 If EPA is
forced to litigate its position that living products of bio-
technological advances are subject to TSCA regulation, many
statutory construction and policy arguments concerning
TSCA will no doubt arise. The discussion below explores
these arguments.
C. Legal Arguments
EPA's most fundamental argument in favor of its author-
ity to review living organisms as TSCA chemical substances is
that, based upon the plain meaning of TSCA's definition of
chemical substances, "Ja]ny DNA molecule, however created,
is an organic substance of a particular molecular identity and
is a combination of organic substances of particular molecular
identities occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemi-
cal reaction or occurring in nature," and thus is a TSCA-de-
Applications, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978) (quoted in 1981 OTA Report, supra note
1, at 226).
However, only a few weeks after the above statement, EPA altered its position on
the possible scope of TSCA's definition of chemical substances. In promulgating its
final TSCA chemical inventory reporting regulations, EPA received a comment that
"[c]ommercial biological preparations such as yeasts, bacteria and fungi should not be
considered 'chemical substances' under TSCA." Inventory Reporting Regulations, 42
Fed. Reg. 64,572, 64,584 (Dec. 23, 1977) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 710.1-.8 (1985)).
EPA rebutted this comment by stating that the definition of chemical substance
"does not exclude life forms which may be manufactured for commercial purposes
and nothing in the legislative history [of TSCA] would suggest otherwise." 42 Fed.
Reg. at 64585. EPA has thereafter consistently maintained that it has the authority
to regulate living organisms as TSCA chemical substances. See 49 Fed. Reg. at
50,886-96.
31. See id. at 50,886-87.
32. House Subcomm. Report, supra notc 9, at 50. Several other commentators
have also noted the likelihood of litigation over EPA's expansive view of the TSCA
definition of chemical substances. See, e.g., 1984 OTA Report, supra note 1, at 372;
Karny, supra note 10, at 848; McChesney & Adler, supra note 10, at 10373; McGarity
& Bayer, supra note 7, at 505-06.
9
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fined chemical substance. 33 In addition, EPA has asserted that
life forms such as microorganisms are themselves TSCA
chemical substances because they are combinations of DNA
molecules and other TSCA chemical substances.3"
EPA's position represents a somewhat expansive con-
struction of TSCA's statutory language. As EPA itself has
acknowledged:
TSCA coverage extends to chemical substances and mix-
tures used in a wide range of general, industrial, commer-
cial, and consumer applications. In the context of biotech-
nology, products partially subject to review under TSCA
include microorganisms in certain physically contained
uses (such as the production of pesticides and other com-
mercial chemicals and the conversion of biomass for en-
ergy) and in certain uses involving direct release to the
environment (e.g., pollutant degradation, enhanced oil re-
covery, metal extraction and concentration, and certain
non-food agricultural applications, such as nitrogen
fixation) .35
A fundamental dilemma presented by either the DNA
molecule or life form view of TSCA-defined chemical sub-
stances is that, in the extreme, both approaches lead inevita-
bly to the conclusion that plants and animals (including
human beings, which are life forms teeming with DNA mole-
cules) fall within TSCA's regulatory scope.36
33. House Subcomm. Report app. C, supra note 9, at 143; see also 49 Fed. Reg.
at 50,886.
34. See House Subcomm. Report app. C, supra note 9, at 144; see also 49 Fed.
Reg. at 50,886.
35. 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,887. Note that in implementing TSCA, EPA has chosen in
the past to cover pesticide intermediates, but not food, food additive, drug, or cos-
metic intermediates under TSCA. EPA explicitly set forth this policy when enunciat-
ing its TSCA inventory reporting rules, see 42 Fed. Reg. at 64,586, and intends to
maintain the same policy for biotechnology products. "Consistent with this policy,
microorganisms used to produce pesticides would fall under TSCA jurisdiction, while
the pesticide itself would fall under FIFRA." 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,887.
36. As one commentator has warned:
A court that faces the reductio ad absurdum argument that . . . TSCA is a
substitute for Title 18 of the United States Code because we are all the slaves
of our DNA well might refuse to allow EPA to extend its authority over toxic
[Vol. 3
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However, it seems unlikely that any court would find that
plants and animals fall within the ambit of TSCA regulation.
First, TSCA's legislative intent and regulatory structure no-
where suggest that TSCA regulation be extended to higher life
forms such as plants and animals. Second, EPA has observed
that "a DNA molecule per se does not have any use aside
from the life form of which it is a part. 3 7 This observation
leaves EPA free to "craft an argument that chemical sub-
stances which have a use only as part of the life form are not
subject to TSCA jurisdiction."38 The practical result of the
above statements is a justification for EPA exclusion of a par-
ticular life form and its component DNA from TSCA regula-
tion. Consequently, EPA has explicitly stated that it generally
does not intend to regulate plants and animals as TSCA
chemical substances. 9 Although this approach does not to-
tally resolve the logical inconsistencies in applying the term
chemical substances to some life forms but not others, deci-
sions of this type are probably sufficiently justifiable under
the traditional notions of agency policymaking powers, due
deference to agency discretion, and the legislative intent un-
derlying TSCA. 0
EPA may also draw support by analogy for its position
that life forms are chemical substances from two recent cases
dealing with the patentability of living organisms under U.S.
patent law. In In re Bergy," the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals held that genetically engineered living microorgan-
isms are patentable subject matter under U.S. patent law.42 In
substances to control over organisms that produce toxic substances.
McGarity & Bayer, supra note 7, at 538 n.341.
37. House Subcomm. Report app. C, supra note 9, at 145 n.4.
38. Id.
39. See 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,887. EPA has set forth a twofold rationale for this
approach. First, "[miost genetically engineered plants and animals will be used for
food or food-related purposes, which are excluded from TSCA." Id.; see also 15
U.S.C. at § 2602(2)(B)(vi). Second, although it is likely that plants and animals will in
the future be genetically engineered for non-food uses, "major [flederal expertise on
plants and animals lies in USDA and DOI," not EPA. 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,887.
40. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
41. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
42. Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
1985]
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reaching this conclusion, the court observed that the intrinsic
nature and potential uses of both naturally occurring and ge-
netically engineered microorganisms "are analogous in practi-
cal use to inanimate chemical compositions such as reactants,
reagents, and catalysts used in the chemical industry. 43 The
court therefore concluded that "no legally significant differ-
ence [exists] between active chemicals which are classified as
'dead' and organisms used for their chemical reactions which
take place because they are 'alive.' Life is largely chemistry."4"
Bergy was affirmed by the landmark United States Su-
preme Court decision Diamond v. Chakrabarty.45 However, it
must be noted that the Court's decision in Chakrabarty was
limited to the organism at issue in the case: namely, a
"human-made, genetically engineered bacterium .. .capable
of breaking down multiple components of crude oil" believed
useful in the treatment of oil spills." The Court specifically
noted that the organism involved was "a new bacterium with
markedly different characterisitics from any found in na-
ture . . . .", Thus, if EPA relies on Chakrabarty for analo-
gous support of regulation of microorganisms as TSCA chemi-
cal substances, it could face the danger of limiting itself to
TSCA regulation of only genetically engineered micro-
organisms. Nevertheless, EPA has stated that it believes its
TSCA authority extends over both indigenous and nonindige-
nous (exotic) naturally occurring microorganisms as well as
genetically engineered microorganisms. 8
EPA also has several, persuasive arguments for viewing
microorganisms as TSCA chemical substances based upon
TSCA's legislative history. First, TSCA was intended to be
gap-filling legislation, 9 and "invoking TSCA jurisdiction over
43. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 975.
44. Id. (emphasis in original).
45. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
46. Id. at 305 & n.2.
47. Id. at 310.
48. 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,881. A nonindigenous or exotic microorganism is one
placed in an environment where it is not native. Id. at 50,906.
49. See S. Rep. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4491, 4495.
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life forms would be consistent with the gap-filling function." 50
Second, TSCA's legislative history shows that Congress recog-
nized that "basically everything in our environment is com-
posed of chemical substances and therefore the definition of
'chemical substances' is necessarily somewhat broad." 51 Fi-
nally, a review of the legislative history shows that the Senate
version of TSCA did not initially include naturally occurring
substances within the definition of chemical substances. The
House amended the bill to include naturally occurring sub-
stances, and this amended definition was eventually
adopted.52 It can thus be argued that TSCA's express statu-
tory language and Congress's legislative intent both clearly
support the view that TSCA's scope is not limited to synthetic
or engineered chemical substances, but includes naturally oc-
curring and genetically engineered microorganisms as well.
The above-mentioned arguments favoring EPA's position
should not be taken as foreclosing any possible counterargu-
ments. EPA has recognized the major counterarguments to its
position, although it feels these counterarguments "require ar-
guing against the plain statutory language. '5 3 The principal
argument against EPA's inclusion of life forms within the
TSCA definition of chemical substances goes as follows:
[T]here is no legislative history that Congress contem-
plated TSCA regulation of life forms. The legislative his-
tory references numerous examples of problems which the
statute was intended to address; life forms are not among
them. Indeed, at the time Congress considered and passed
TSCA, recombinant DNA research was in its infancy, and
seemed to have applications only in the pharmaceutical
area. 
54
50. House Subcomm. Report, supra note 9, at 144; see also 49 Fed. Reg. at
50887.
51. H.R. Rep. No. 1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in R. Druley & G.
Ordway, supra note 19, at 174, 182.
52. See H.R. Rep. No. 1679, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4539, 4541-42.
53. House Subcomm. Report app. C, supra note 9, at 144.
54. Id. at 144-45.
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Several policy arguments can also be made in opposition
to EPA's position that life forms are within the TSCA defini-
tion of chemical substances. For example, EPA has little ex-
pertise or experience in biotechnology. 55 Furthermore, EPA
has been slow to implement its toxic substances program due
to understaffing and other considerations.&I Finally, the ex-
isting TSCA regulatory structure may not be workable for the
regulation of microorganisms and other life forms. EPA has
recognized this potential problem:
Although it appears that living organisms are chemical
substances under TSCA, it is somewhat novel to interpret
TSCA for such substances, because it has always been in-
terpreted in the context ofl non-living matter. Terms such
as manufacture, process, chemical identity, molecular
structure and exposure take on unique meanings when
applied to living organisms."
Although the above counterarguments are initially per-
suasive, they contains several inherent weaknesses. First,
TSCA is a remedial statute designed to protect public health
and welfare as well as the environment, and thus "should be
given a construction consistent with its objectives. '58 Second,
the statutory definition of chemical substances appears on its
face to include living organisms, and "if Congress has made a
choice of language which fairly brings a given situation within
a statute, it is unimportant that the particular application
may not have been contemplated by the legislators."5 9 Third,
although "[ilt is likely that in 1976 Congress never considered
55. House Subcomm. Report app. B, supra note 9, at 138.
56. See 1984 OTA Report, supra note 1, at 372.
57. House Subcomm. Report app. B, supra note 9, at 126.
58. School Dist. of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16, 19 (3d Cir. 1981). A reme-
dial statute should be liberally construed to effectuate the remedial purpose for which
it was enacted. 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 60.01 at 29 (C. Sands rev. 4th
ed. 1974). "What is called a liberal construction is ordinarily one which makes the
statutory rule or principle apply to more things or in more situations than would be
the case under a strict construction." Id.
59. Bergy, 596 F.2d at 973 (quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945))
(other citations omitted).
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the nascent biotechnology industry," 0 it seems presumptuous
to assume that, at the time of TSCA's enactment, Congress
was totally unaware of the potential environmental implica-
tions of the emerging area of biotechnology. The scientific, so-
cial, and ethical implications of recombinant DNA research
were being openly debated during the mid-1970's. In fact, the
debates over the potential widespread hazards of such bio-
technological research led directly to the promulgation of the
original NIH guidelines for recombinant DNA research; these
guidelines were published three months before TSCA was en-
acted into law." Finally, EPA is rapidly acquiring expertise in
biotechnology via its FIFRA regulatory programs.2
D. TSCA's Impact on Commercial Biotechnology
TSCA's regulatory mechanism will clearly have a direct
impact on commercial biotechnology. For example, EPA has
already set forth in great detail the applicability of TSCA's
section 5(a)6 8 premanufacturing notification (PMN) provisions
to commercial biotechnology.6 4 In addition, EPA has specifi-
cally noted that the recordkeeping requirements of section
8(c), 65 the notification provisions of section 8(e), 66 and the ia-
60. McChesney & Adler, supra note 10, at 10374.
61. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed.
Reg. 27,902, 27,911-922 (July 7, 1976).
62. See supra note 17.
63. 15 U.S.C. at § 2604(a).
64. See 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,887-93. Note that the PMN provisions apply only to
"new chemical substances" (defined as substances not included on the TSCA Chemi-
cal Inventory list, see 15 U.S.C. at § 2602(9)) and to chemical substances employed
for a "significant new use"(to be determined by EPA rulemaking after "a considera-
tion of all relevant factors," id. at § 2604(a)(2)). "Naturally occurring substances" are
not subject to the PMN requirements, and EPA has proposed "to determine whether
a commercial organism is new or naturally occurring on the basis of the techniques
used to produce it." 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,888-89.
65. 15 U.S.C. at § 2607(c). Section 8(c) requires that manufacturers, processors,
and distributors of chemical substances and mixtures keep records of "significant ad-
verse reactions to health or the environment ... alleged to have been caused by the
substance or mixture." Id.
66. Id. at § 2607(e). Section 8(e) requires manufacturers, processors, and distrib-
utors of chemical substances and mixtures to immediately notify EPA of information
"which reasonably supports the conclusion that such substance or mixture presents a
substantial risk of injury to health or the environment."
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portation provisions of section 13(a)6 7 are all likely to affect
the biotechnology industry.68
Other TSCA provisions not specifically highlighted by
EPA may also play a role in commercial biotechnology regula-
tion. For example, section 669 provides EPA with broad regu-
latory powers which it may implement upon a finding that the
manufacture, processing, distribution, use, or disposal of a
chemical substance or mixture "presents or will present" an
unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment. '70
Note that the scope of these regulatory powers is vast: it in-
cludes the power to prohibit or limit the manufacture,
processing, or distribution of such chemical substances and
mixtures, and the power to compel submission or revision of
quality control procedures used in the manufacturing or
processing of the chemical substance or mixture at issue.71
However, most of the section 6 provisions are unlikely to be
immediately applicable to commercial biotechnology, as "the
scientific evidence probably does not support a finding that
most genetically engineered molecules or organisms present
an unreasonable risk."'7 2
Upon a finding by EPA that a chemical substance or mix-
ture is an imminent hazard,73 EPA may commence a civil ac-
tion in federal district court pursuant to section 7 to seize the
chemical substance or mixture at issue, or for such other relief
as may be necessary to protect health or the environment. 74
67. Id. at § 2612(a). Section 13(a) requires that for any chemical substance or
mixture to be allowed entry into the United States, it must comply with all TSCA
statutory and regulatory requirements. Id. Note that the United States Customs Ser-
vice has issued a rule requiring importers of chemical substances to certify at the port
of entry that either the substances contained in the shipment are subject to TSCA
and comply with all applicable TSCA rules and orders, or that the substances at issue
are not subject to TSCA. See 40 C.FiR. § 707.20 (1985).
68. 49 Fed. Reg. at 50,893.
69. 15 U.S.C. at § 2605.
70. Id. at § 2605(a).
71. Id. at § 2605(b).
72. Karny, supra note 10, at 849.
73. An imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture is one which
"presents an imminent and unreasonable risk of serious or widespread injury to
health or the environment." 15 U.S.C. at § 2606(f).
74. See id.
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This provision would be useful in an emergency situation in-
volving either a naturally occurring or genetically engineered
microorganism. However, absent such extraordinary circum-
stances, it is unlikely to play a major role in biotechnology
regulation.
III. Conclusion
It is likely that EPA's stated position that both naturally
occurring and genetically engineered microorganisms are sub-
ject to regulation as TSCA chemical substances will be upheld
if challenged in court. TSCA's broad statutory language defin-
ing chemical substances seems clearly inclusive of both natu-
rally occurring and genetically engineered microorganisms. In
addition, the legislative history and gap-filling nature of
TSCA favor a broad construction of its statutory language. Fi-
nally, "the tendency of the courts [is] to construe the environ-
mental statutes broadly in order to achieve their remedial
purposes .... ,,71 Any inherent conflicts resulting from such a
broad construction are likely to be left to EPA's discretion
and expertise to sort out and align.
Louis S. Sorell
75. McChesney & Adler, supra note 7, at 10374.
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